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Abstract In the current research, we experimentally exam-
ined the effect of providing local or global information about
the impacts of climate change on individuals’ perceived im-
portance of climate change and on their willingness to take
action to address it, including policy support. We examined
these relationships in the context of individuals’ general value
orientations. Our findings, from 99 US residents, suggest that
different kinds of climate information (local, global, or none)
interact with values vis-à-vis our dependent variables.
Specifically, while self-transcendent values predict perceived
importance and pro-environmental behavior across all three
information conditions, the effect on policy support is less
clear. Furthermore, we detected a Breactance effect^ where
individuals with self-enhancing values who read local infor-
mation thought that climate change was less important and
were less willing to engage in pro-environmental behavior
and support policy than self-enhancing individuals in the other
information conditions. These results suggest that policy
makers and public communicators may want to be cognizant
of their audience’s general value orientation. Local
information may not only be ineffective but may also prove
counterproductive with individuals whose value orientations
are more self-enhancing than self-transcendent.
Keywords Climate change . Local/global climate
information . Values . Pro-environmental behavior . Climate
policy . Policy support
Introduction
Many researchers have assumed that presenting citizens with
information about local climate impacts will persuade them,
and their policy-makers, to act. In 2003, Rajendra Pachauri—
then the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)—stressed that BI am aware that there is an
opportunity for much political debate when you start to predict
the impact of climate change on specific regions. But if you
want action you must provide this information^ (Schiermeier
2003, p. 879). Indeed, when surveyed, most US citizens indi-
cate that they believe that any effects of climate change will be
felt far in the future by people in other parts of the world
(Leiserowitz et al. 2011). This supports the concern that a
distal view of the consequences of climate change leads peo-
ple to discount the need for action. Thus, researchers have
called for communication strategies that anchor the discussion
by highlighting local climate change impacts (e.g.,
Leiserowitz 2007; Moser 2010). Putting such general recom-
mendations to empirical test, our data suggest that the effec-
tiveness of providing local climate information to elicit pro-
environmental behavior and policy support may well depend
on people’s underlying value orientations. In other words,
while describing the local consequences of climate change
may increase perceived importance, and actions for some, a
local focus will not be useful for all populations. Specifically,
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we propose that individual differences in value orientation (in
particular whether one leans more towards self-transcendence
or self-enhancing values) will relate to the extent to which
local or global information is particularly effective in motivat-
ing environmental behavioral change and policy support.
Further, our data hints at the possibility that the local frame
may prove threatening to a predictable segment of the popu-
lation. This insight may prove beneficial for governments,
environmental groups, journalists, and scientists working to
share the findings and implications of climate science. In the
sections that follow, we review literatures on attitudes, self-
interest, values, and pro-environmental behavior that in-
formed the design of our study. We follow this with a discus-
sion of our specific hypotheses, the setup of our experimental
study, our findings and discussion.
The loose connection between climate change attitudes
and behavior
The reality that even those who harbor pro-environmental
attitudes rarely walk their talk has puzzled scholars for de-
cades. High environmental concern in political polls (e.g.,
European Commission 2014; Leiserowitz et al. 2014) is often
met with negligible pro-environmental actions (e.g., Dunlap
and Scarce 1991). In a meta-analysis, Bamberg and Möser
(2007) found a correlation of r=.35 between environmental
attitudes and behavior. Some of this disconnect may be due to
a lack of Bmeasurement correspondence^ between general
attitudes and specific behaviors. As Ajzen et al. (2011) high-
light, we would expect more general attitudes to correlate less
with specific environmental behaviors than when compared to
more specific attitudes on specific behaviors (e.g., attitudes
about recycling will be more highly correlated with recycling
behavior compared to overall support for general environmen-
tal policy). Whitmarsh et al. (2011) similarly find a disconnect
between behavior and both attitudes and knowledge. Thus,
people say they care, and to a certain extent, they understand
which actions would be most likely to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions (e.g., travel choices), yet they are unwilling or un-
able to make these changes to their routines. Whitmarsh et al.
(2011) suggest that this disconnect is partially due to people’s
lack of carbon capability, a construct that considers both in-
dividual and societal constraints. The weak link between atti-
tudes (or knowledge) and behavior is especially problematic
for policy makers who often rely on large-scale surveys to
gauge the public’s willingness to take action and support cli-
mate policy.
However, one recurring key finding is that the attitude-
behavior gap narrows for attitudes that are perceived to be
important (e.g., see Boninger et al. 1995; Krosnick and Petty
1995). Important attitudes are more deeply ingrained—for
example, Holbrook et al. (2005) found that individuals who
believed climate change was important, compared to those
who did not, reported thinking more about the issue. Higher
levels of personal importance, in turn, predicted taking action
on climate change, such as writing letters and donating money
to organizations concerned with climate change (Visser et al.
2003). If we accept that importance predicts action, we need to
understand the precursors to personal importance.
One promising precursor to importance is self-interest.
Boninger et al. (1995) found that 63 % of survey respondents
cited self-interest as the reason they considered a number of
issues important. Other researchers have confirmed this link
(e.g., Eaton and Visser 2008; Eaton et al. 2008). If these
scholars are correct, then manipulating self-interest by provid-
ing people with local climate information should result in
changes in personal importance of the issue, behavior, and
policy support. This logic is supported by Construal Level
Theory, which suggests that a local informational focus (cf.,
a global focus) should reduce the psychological distance be-
tween climate change consequences and personal action
(Trope and Liberman 2010).
Multiple self-report studies of self-identified environmen-
talists support this view. For example, active members of the
Sierra Club, an environmental organization, are significantly
more likely to have experienced personal harm from a nega-
tive environmental event (e.g., local chemical incident) com-
pared to less active members (Manzo and Weinstein 1987).
Similarly, the extent to which one feels personally threatened
by pollution predicts pro-environmental behaviors, such as
driving less, recycling, and water conservation (Baldassare
and Katz 1992; see also Axelrod and Lehman 1993). Similar
relationships appear to exist at the policy level such that cities
that experienced climate change related events (e.g., extreme
weather) were more likely to participate in the Cities for
Climate Protection campaign than cities that have been spared
climate-related events (Zahran et al. 2008).
Personal threat of climate change has also been linked to
support for a range of policies to address the issue (e.g., Brody
et al. 2008; Zahran et al. 2006). In addition to the correlational
research in support of this view, a recent experimental study
by Scannell and Gifford (2013) found that providing individ-
uals with local climate information—and thus highlighting
personal threat—increased their engagement with the issue.
Therefore, there are empirically based reasons to believe that
providing a local focus on climate change will shift
perceptions and behaviors. Not all researchers, however, find
support for the link between importance and environmental
behavior. For example, Spence and Pidgeon (2010) detected
no such relation in an experimental study conducted the UK.
Similarly, Shwom et al. (2008) found no value of local climate
information to sway households to support climate-related
policies in their US-based experimental study (for another
skeptical view, see Evans et al. 2012). Thus, it remains unclear
whether simply providing local information about the impact
of climate change will engage people’s self-interest and
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thereby elicit behavioral change and policy support or whether
there might be other factors at play.
Values
We believe that there are other factors involved in the link
between personal importance and action. Specifically, we
support Boninger et al.’s (1995) view that it is necessary to
take into account individuals’ values when considering this
link. Values, which are deep-seated normative core beliefs
(e.g., on equality or justice), transcend situations and fit
within a system of other values (Rokeach 1973).
Schwartz (1992, 1994) created a theoretical framework to
explain how different values relate to each other. In doing
so, Schwartz groups values along two continua with oppo-
site poles, namely conservation versus openness to change
values and self-enhancing versus self-transcendent values
(Schwartz 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al. 2001). We focused
on the latter axis, the tension between self-enhancement
values (the importance of social power, status, recognition,
material achievements, etc.) and self-transcendence
(values or concern for the broader community and beliefs
about justice). Prior research indicates that individuals who
value the well-being of larger communities—i.e., those
high in self-transcendence—are more likely to harbor
pro-environmental attitudes and take pro-environmental
action than individuals who value personal gain and sta-
tus—i.e., self-enhancement (e.g., Gagnon Thompson and
Barton 1994; Karp 1996). Thus, people with strong self-
transcendent value orientations tend to be more concerned
about the environment and more likely to act compared to
those who prize self enhancement (e.g., Nordlund and
Garvill 2002, 2003; Schultz et al. 2005; Schultz and
Zelezny 1999; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Steg and de Groot
2012; Stern et al. 1995; see de Groot and Steg 2008 for a
review).
Of particular importance for this paper is the recurrent find-
ing that individuals with self-transcendent values engagemore
in climate-friendly behavior and policy support than people
with self-enhancing values (Corner et al. 2014; Nilsson et al.
2004; Nilsson and Biel 2007, 2008; Poortinga et al. 2004; Steg
et al. 2011; see also Leiserowitz 2006). Furthermore, research
suggests that existing value orientations may interact with
environmental information. For example, Bolderdijk et al.
(2013) found that an informational campaign (i.e., having par-
ticipants view a movie about the environmental consequence
of bottled water) was motivational for those who held strong
biospheric values but not for those lacking these values. Given
the strong relation between self-transcendent values and envi-
ronmental action, we explored the extent to which values
might interact with the level of information (local versus glob-
al) to influence individuals’ environmental decisions.
Current study
Specifically, we sought to assess the influence of information
relevant to self-interest as a function of one’s value orientation.
To do so, we measured participants’ core personal values and
then assigned them randomly to read information about climate
change impacts, which were presented through either a local or
global lens (the control group did not read about the impacts at
all). We subsequently measured participants’ self-reported cli-
mate change importance, their pro-environmental behavioral
intentions, and their willingness to support climate policy.
Based on our theoretical review,we hypothesized the following:
Hypothesis 1: Participants who read local climate infor-
mation would report greater importance of climate
change, more pro-environmental behavioral intentions,
and greater climate policy support compared to those
who received global or no information (control group).
Hypothesis 2: Participants with self-transcendent value
orientations would report greater importance of climate
change, more behavioral intentions, and greater climate
policy support than those with self-enhancing value
orientations.
Hypothesis 2a: Participants with strong self-transcendent
values, who received either local or global climate infor-
mation, would report greater importance, behavioral in-
tentions, and climate policy support than those in the
control condition (no information).
Hypothesis 2b: Within participants with self-enhancing
values, individuals who received local information would
report greater importance, behavioral intentions, and cli-
mate policy support than those who received either global
or no information (control).
Methods
Participants
Ninety-nine1 Vermont (USA) residents completed an online
survey (64 % female,2 M=36 years, range 16–75).
Participants were recruited through emails, advertisements,
social networking sites, and community organizations. All
participants were treated in accordance with the ethical guide-
lines of the American Psychological Association (APA 2010).
1 Three participants could not be assigned to an experimental
group and were removed from subsequent analyses on exper-
imental conditions. Our experimental groups were thus local,
30, global, 27, and control, 39.
2 One participant did not indicate their sex.
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Materials
Values
General value orientations were measured with the Schwartz
Value Survey (SVS—Schwartz 1992; 1994). The scale con-
sists of 56 value items such as BEQUALITY (equal opportu-
nity for all).^ Participants completed the full scale, ranking
each value item on a Likert scale where −1 = opposed to my
values, 0 = not important, 3 = important, and 7 = extremely
important. To evaluate self-enhancing and self-transcendent
values, we used two subscales of the SVS in our analyses:
power (four items) and universalism (eight items).
Climate change information
Information about local (Vermont/New England area) and
global future climate change impacts came from the Global
Climate Change Impacts in the United States report (Karl
et al. 2009). Additional information about global impacts
was based on the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC
2007). Prior to reading information about climate change, par-
ticipants received information about the authorship of the re-
ports, as well as the fact that carbon dioxide emissions from
human activities will likely increase average temperatures by
2.5–4.0 °F by the end of the century. Examples, such as a
devastating 2008 flash flood in Ripton, Vermont (local infor-
mation), or the 2010 flooding in Pakistan (global informa-
tion), were added to make climate impacts more understand-
able and tangible. Each item about local information was
matched with an equivalent item reporting global impacts.
Pilot testing indicated that both the understandability, as well
as the level of detail, did not differ for local and global
information.
Importance
Personal importance of climate change was measured with
three items, one from Boninger et al. (1995) BHow important
is the issue of climate change to you personally?^ and two
from Schoenefeld and Hofer (2010) BHow much do you per-
sonally care about climate change?^ and BHow important is
climate change to you in relationship to other issues?^ Items
were rated on a 5-point Likert scale with anchors 1 = not at all
important, 5 = very important). We averaged these to create a
measure of personal importance of climate change
(Cronbach’s α=.92).
Climate change mitigation intentions
We asked participants how willing they were to engage in 48
pro-environmental behaviors to reduce their personal climate
impact. Forty-five of these items were selected from existing
scales (Kaiser and Schultz 2009; Kaiser and Wilson 2000;
Kaiser et al. 1999; Schoenefeld and Hofer 2010; Sinatra
et al. 2012; Stern et al. 1999; Thapa 1999), while four were
created for this study. When necessary we modified the re-
sponse option so that participants rated their willingness to
perform each behavior across the 48 items on a 4-point scale
where 0 = not willing at all; 3 = totally willing (or, I’m already
doing this). In addition, participants had the opportunity to
indicate that BThis does not apply to me.^ For analyses, an
average of all behavioral items was calculated (Cronbach’s
α=.97).3
Climate change policy support
General climate change policy support was evaluated with a
modified version of an eight-item measure used by Shwom
et al. (2008). The original instrument asked about support for
eight US-federal climate change policy options. We adjusted
the items used by Shwom et al. (2008) to reflect contemporary
US policy options, taking out the word Btax^ whenever pos-
sible (see Lizza 2010 for our rationale) and added an item
about a cap-and-dividend system. Individuals rated their sup-
port for each policy option on a five-point scale (1 = definitely
do not support the policy; 5 = definitely support the policy).
We expanded Shwom’s four-point response options to include
a midpoint (3 = undecided) to avoid forcing individuals to take
a position. Responses were averaged to create a composite
policy support score (Cronbach’s α=.87).4
Procedure
Data were collected online. Participants first completed the
full Schwartz Value Survey and then were assigned randomly
to one of three conditions: They either read a local narrative
regarding climate change, a global narrative, or no informa-
tion (i.e., our control condition). Specifically, participants who
read about local or global information both started with read-
ing a paragraph from the Global Climate Change Impacts in
the United States report (Karl et al. 2009), followed by a
paragraph about the causes of climate change. After this in-
troduction, they read either local or global information.
3 Seventy-one individuals left a few items blank (on average
0.38 responses per item). These items were replaced with the
average for that particular individual. BNot applicable^ items
were not included in calculating individual averages (on aver-
age 5.5 responses per item).
4 Ten individuals skipped an item or two (on average 1.33
responses per item), and in this case, we used their average
on the other policy questions to replace the missing data. Two
individuals were excluded from analyses on this measure be-
cause they failed to rate at least 75 % of the policy support
items.
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Following this, all participants answered items assessing their
perceptions of the importance of climate change, pro-
environmental behavioral intentions, and support for climate
policy. Finally, participants answered demographic questions.
Results
Climate change importance
Contrary to hypothesis 1, one-way analyses of variance
(ANOVA) revealed no main effect of information conditions
on ratings of climate importance (F(2, 93)=.22, ns), behavior
(F(2, 93)=.52, ns) or policy support (F(2, 92)=.12, ns). In
order to test hypotheses 2, 2a and 2b, we used ordinary
least-square regressions (OLS) to analyze the extent to which
values and type of information predict our outcome variables.
Per our hypotheses, we also included interaction terms in the
model. In each case, we used two predictors from the SVS,
namely universalism and power5 and the information condi-
tions (dummy coded with control as the reference category),
and we analyzed each of the three dependent variables (im-
portance, policy support, and behavioral intentions) in sepa-
rate regressions. As detailed in Table 1, universalism, but not
power, significantly predicted climate change importance. In
addition, there is an interaction between values and informa-
tion, such that harboring self-enhancing values and receiving
local climate information significantly and negatively predicts
importance. Indeed, adding this interaction into the model
increases results in the model predicting approximately 10 %
more of the variance (R2=.41). Taken together, regarding im-
portance, we thus supported hypothesis 2 insofar as people
who held stronger, compared with weaker, self-transcendent
values thought that climate change was more important. We
found no support for hypothesis 2a and found the inverse of
what we predicted for hypothesis 2b such that those individ-
uals with strong self-enhancing values who read local infor-
mation about climate impacts were less likely to believe that
climate change was important compared with their peers who
read about global impacts or no information (control).
Findings from a parallel regression on our second depen-
dent variable, behavioral intentions, closely resemble this pat-
tern (Table 2). While self-transcendent values predict pro-
environmental behavior across conditions, an interaction
again revealed a Breactance effect^, such that those embracing
self-enhancing values and receiving local information nega-
tively predict willingness to engage in pro-environmental be-
havior. Adding the interaction term again increased the
amount of explained variance by about 10 %. These trends
were less clear on policy support, our third outcome variable
(Table 3). Self-transcendent values did not significantly pre-
dict policy support when the interaction terms were included
in the model. But again, we found a significant and negative
relationship between favoring self-enhancing values and re-
ceiving local climate information on policy support. In addi-
tion, a trend revealed a possible interaction between self-
transcendent values and global information.
Discussion and Conclusions
The current study examined the influence of personal values
and the level of information about climate change impact,
local or global, on individuals’ perceptions of the importance
of climate change, their willingness to take action, and their
climate policy support. In line with earlier findings, we found
support for the view that individuals who embrace self-
transcendent values are more likely to think that climate
change is important and intend to engage in more pro-
environmental behaviors than individuals who report lower
self-transcendent values. This trend was less clear on policy
support. However, there is no general impact of presenting
climate change impacts through either a local or a global lens.
Indeed, we found that the connection between level of infor-
mation and outcome variables differed as a function of indi-
viduals’ value orientations. Self-transcendent values still pre-
dicted importance and pro-environmental behavior irrespec-
tive of information condition. In contrast to our predictions,
we detected what might be termed a Breactance effect^ in
which presenting self-enhancing individuals with local cli-
mate information appears to have lowered their perceived im-
portance of climate change, their willingness to engage in pro-
environmental behaviors, and their support for climate policy.
Thus, our findings point toward a more nuanced understand-
ing of how to approach climate change communication and
policy discussions. We discuss our main findings in detail
below.
Values
Value orientations relate significantly to climate change im-
portance and behavior. As predicted, we found a positive re-
lationship between scoring high on self-transcendent values
on the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz 1992, 1994) and
perceived importance of climate change, as well as greater
willingness to take action. However, we found no such rela-
tionship for self-enhancing values. Individual differences in
value orientations, particularly for environmental issues,
might therefore explain some of the attitudes-behavior gap
(Bamberg andMöser 2007). That said, we found that for some
individuals, values interacted with information.
5 We started using universalism, power, achievement, and be-
nevolence in our analyses, but given that the latter two had no
significant predictive power, we dropped them from our
models.
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Values and climate impact information
Although our data failed to show an overall effect of commu-
nicating local versus global climate impacts on people’s en-
gagement with the issue, we did find that value orientations
mattered and that for some people, this interacted with the
level of information. Similar to others, we found that self-
transcendent values predicted climate chance importance and
pro-environmental behavior. Interestingly, it did not signifi-
cantly predict policy support, but a trend points towards a
possible interaction between global information and self-
transcendent values for this variable. In addition, we had as-
sumed that for those who hold stronger self-enhancing values,
hearing about local effects of climate would increase the rel-
evancy of the information and thus their support for our out-
come variables. This was not what we found. In contrast to our
hypotheses, we found that holding self-enhancing values and
receiving local information reduced all three outcome vari-
ables (importance, a willingness to engage in behaviors to
mitigate climate change, and policy support). It may be that
for individuals who value power and control, hearing about
actual local harm caused by climate change was simply too
threatening. These individuals may have experienced reac-
tance to this threat and, thus, discounted the importance, their
willingness to engage in behavior to mitigate the threat, and
their policy support.
It is relevant to note that information on local and global
climate change impacts was illustrated with examples of ac-
tual events that had already occurred, as opposed to hypothet-
ical local or global effects. Perhaps, this approach contravened
power-based values, inducing a sense of helplessness and sub-
sequent denial or discounting of this information as a way to
uphold self-enhancing values. If future research supports this
finding, it would caution against highlighting the local threat
to individuals with self-enhancing value orientations. Further,
this suggests that researchers should carefully assess whether
it is possible to mitigate or short circuit this type of response
from those self-enhancing individuals. For example Sheldon
Table 1 The impact of climate
information and values on
perceived climate change
importance (N=99)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Universalism .62 .12 .51** .62 .13 .51** .55 .20 .45**
Power −.07 .08 −.09 −.10 .09 −.12 .13 .15 .15
Local info .16 .20 .08 .10 .20 .05
Global info .25 .21 .12 .15 .21 .07
Univ×local .17 .30 .07
Univ×global .20 .31 .10
Power×local −.53 .21 −.33*
Power×global −.12 .22 −.09
R2 .32 .33 .41
F 22.32** 11.27** 7.50**
Values were mean centered in the interactions to avoid colinearity
*p<.05; **p<.01
Table 2 The impact of climate
information and values on
behavioral intentions (N=99)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B Β
Universalism .30 .06 .49** .30 .06 .49** .22 .10 .36*
Power −.07 .04 −.17*** −.08 .04 −.20† .07 .07 .16
Local info −.02 .10 −.02 −.07 .10 −.07
Global info .03 .10 .03 .00 .10 .00
Univ×local .07 .14 .06
Univ×global .23 .15 .23
Power×local −.28 .10 −.34**
Power×global −.13 .10 −.20
R2 .36 .37 .48
F 26.80** 13.60** 9.90**
Values were mean centered in the interactions to avoid colinearity
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p=.09; †p=.07
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et al. (2011) found that conservatives, whomay bemore likely
to hold self-enhancing value orientations, were more support-
ive of environmental behavior when first asked to consider
traditional US-American values. Feinberg and Willer (2013)
found that conservatives were more environmentally con-
cerned when the issue was framed around purity and sanctity
instead of the harm/care moral framing typically used when
discussing environmental issues. Perhaps, when debating real,
local consequences of climate change, it will be necessary to
include reminders of traditional conservative values or moral
pleas framed to appeal to strong self-enhancing values. The
Breactance effect^ for individuals with self-enhancing value
orientation, who received local climate information regarding
perceived importance and behavior, warrants further investi-
gation. Theoretically, our findings question the usefulness of
engaging self-interest to elicit pro-environmental behavior
and policy support. However, more research needs to be con-
ducted with a much broader group of participants to verify that
that local information may be problematic for those with
strong self-enhancing values and also explore and test mech-
anisms to reduce this reactance. Overall, our study thus con-
tributes to an ongoing discussion on how values and informa-
tion interact (see Bolderdijk et al. 2013), particularly by
highlighting that, depending on people’s value orientations,
information may be beneficial for some groups but potentially
detrimental for others.
Limitations
Given our geographically restricted sample, it is not pos-
sible to generalize to wider populations. Furthermore, we
recognize that behavioral intentions do not necessarily
translate into actual behavior. However, our results high-
light how values and climate change information interact,
a relationship that should be tested and refined in other
populations. We used the SVS in our study because it
provides a very general measure of value orientations,
thus avoiding prompting individuals in any particular di-
rection. If prompting effects occurred, using the full SVS
furthermore spread the effect across all value types.
However, researchers have recently developed additional
value scales, which should also be used to test interactions
with climate change information. Furthermore, although
we endeavored to provide local and global climate infor-
mation, local climate information may still have been per-
ceived as too distal, given that it was presented on a 50-
year time horizon.
Policy implications
Although preliminary, findings from the current study in-
dicate that policy makers and public communicators may
want to be cognizant of their audience’s general value ori-
entation. In targeted information campaigns to highlight
the importance of climate change, local information may
lead to a Breactance effect^ among individuals who prior-
itize self-enhancing values.
Similarly, if a climate policy is to be implemented at vari-
ous locations, it might make sense to start in places where
general value orientations are more self-transcendent than
self-enhancing. Further, social marketing campaigns aimed
at communicating climate change may benefit from our in-
sights to segment their audiences more effectively (see
Bostrom et al. 2013). In line with other contributions (e.g.,
Evans et al. 2012), our evidence suggests that building climate
change communication campaigns around self-interest may
be less effective in general than hoped or even counterproduc-
tive. Crucially, if our findings draw wider support, general
recommendations about using local climate information
(e.g., Leiserowitz 2007; Moser 2010) may have to be
reviewed.
Table 3 The impact of climate
information and values on policy
support (N=97)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B Β
Universalism .22 .12 .23*** .25 .12 .26* .07 .18 .07
Power −.08 .08 −.13 −.06 .08 −.09 .18 .13 .27
Local info −.07 .19 −.04 −.15 .18 −.09
Global info .09 .19 .06 .04 .19 .02
Univ×local .24 .27 .13
Univ×global .47 .28 .29††
Power×local −.45 .19 −.36*
Power×global −.20 .20 −.18
R2 .10 .10 .23
F 5.02** 2.43† 3.29**
Values were mean centered in the interactions to avoid colinearity
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p=.058; †p=.05; ††p=.09
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Future research
This study contributes to emerging work on people’s value
orientations and their engagement with climate change (see
Corner et al. 2014; O’Brien and Wolf 2010). Clearly, follow-
up research is needed to shed more light on the relationship
between climate information and value orientations in order to
better understand to what extent the expression of values de-
pends on information provision and under which conditions
such information may be counterproductive. Given the impor-
tance of underlying value orientations in environmental deci-
sions and policy support, further inquiries in the origins, du-
rability, and effect of such values—and different ways of mea-
suring them—seem particularly important. When communi-
cating climate change, it would also be useful to assess the
impact of information interventions over time, as well as on
observed behaviors and across larger samples in multiple lo-
cations. Furthermore, future research could also consider com-
munication of other aspects of climate change including
adaptation.
Conclusion
We started this project with an educated hunch that the effec-
tiveness of local climate information to elicit pro-
environmental behavior and policy support would depend on
people’s underlying value orientations as defined by
Schwartz. And indeed, we found that providing regional spe-
cific information (local or global) was not useful for all pop-
ulations. While privileging self-transcending values predicts
importance and pro-environmental behavior, we also found
that using local information led to a reactance against the
information among self-enhancing individuals—thus, open-
ing new theoretical and practical questions about the extent
to which self-interest can drive pro-environmental behavior.
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